How Large are the U.S. Economy Gains from Trade?

From a working paper by Arnaud Costinot and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare: 

Abstract: 

About 8 cents out of every dollar spent in the United States is spent on imports. What if, because of a wall or some other extreme policy intervention, imports were to remain on the other side of the US border? How much would US consumers be willing to pay to prevent this hypothetical policy change from taking place? The answer to this question represents the welfare cost from autarky or, equivalently, the welfare gains from trade. In this article, we discuss how to evaluate these gains using the demand for foreign factor services. The estimates of gains from trade for the US economy that we review range from 2 to 8 percent of GDP. 

A less technical overview is presented in the NBER Digest from April 2018

"How to save humanity from the Malthusian destiny" resulting from AI

From the new NBER working paper by Anton Korinek, Joseph E. Stiglitz  titled, "Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Income Distribution and Unemployment."

Abstract:

Inequality is one of the main challenges posed by the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) and other forms of worker-replacing technological progress.  This paper provides a taxonomy of the associated economic issues:  First, we discuss the general conditions under which new technologies such as AI may lead to a Pareto improvement.  Secondly, we delineate the two main channels through which inequality is affected - the surplus arising to innovators and redistributions arising from factor price changes. Third, we provide several simple economic models to describe how policy can counter these effects, even in the case of a "singularity" where machines come to dominate human labor. Under plausible conditions, non-distortionary taxation can be levied to compensate those who otherwise might lose.  Fourth, we describe the two main channels through which technological progress may lead to technological unemployment via efficiency wage effects and as a transitional phenomenon. Lastly, we speculate on how technologies to create super-human levels of intelligence may affect inequality and on how to save humanity from the Malthusian destiny that may ensue.

Read the whole working paper here. (Gated)

The rise of the machines. What does it mean?

A new working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research by Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock, Chad Syverson. Abstract:  

We live in an age of paradox.  Systems using artificial intelligence match or surpass human-level performance in more and more domains, leveraging rapid advances in other technologies and driving soaring stock prices.  Yet measured productivity growth has declined by half over the past decade, and real income has stagnated since the late 1990s for a majority of Americans.  We describe four potential explanations for this clash of expectations and statistics:  false hopes, mismeasurement, redistribution, and implementation lags.  While a case can be made for each, we argue that lags have likely been the biggest contributor to the paradox.  The most impressive capabilities of AI, particularly those based on machine learning, have not yet diffused widely.  More importantly, like other general purpose technologies, their full effects won't be realized until waves of complementary innovations are developed and implemented.  The required adjustment costs, organizational changes, and new skills can be modeled as a kind of intangible capital. A portion of the value of this intangible capital is already reflected in the market value of firms. However, going forward, national statistics could fail to measure the full benefits of the new technologies and some may even have the wrong sign.

Economist Dani Rodrik: Populism should not be a surprise

The new Dani Rodrik paper: Populism and the Economics of Globalization

Populism may seem like it has come out of nowhere, but it has been on the rise for a while. I argue that economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash. While the backlash may have been predictable, the specific form it took was less so. I distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ with respect to the societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight. The first has been predominant in Latin America, and the second in Europe. I argue that these different reactions are related to the relative salience of different types of globalization shocks.

Is the gig economy's flexibility an asset to labor markets?

Sure to add to the debate about the sharing/gig economy.  "The Value of Flexible Work: Evidence from Uber Drivers" by M. Keith Chen, Judith A. Chevalier, Peter E. Rossi, Emily Oehlsen

Participation in flexible contract work has increased dramatically over the last decade, often in settings where new technologies lower the transaction costs of providing labor flexibly. One prominent example of this is the ride-sharing company Uber, which allows drivers to provide (or not provide) rides anytime they are willing to accept prevailing prices for this service. An Uber-style arrangement offers workers flexibility in both setting a customized work schedule and also adjusting it throughout the day. Using high-frequency data of hourly earnings for Uber drivers, we document the ways in which drivers utilize this real-time flexibility and we estimate the driver surplus generated by this flexibility. We estimate how drivers' reservation wages vary in high frequency from hour to hour, which allows us to study the surplus and supply implications of both flexible and traditional work arrangements. Our results indicate that, while the Uber relationship may have other drawbacks, Uber drivers benefit significantly from real-time flexibility, earning more than twice the surplus they would in less flexible arrangements. If required to supply labor inflexibly at prevailing wages, they would also reduce the hours they supply by more than two-thirds. The implications of our findings for the future of flexible work are discussed. 

It comes down to the willingness to supply more labor.

Gated version of the paper is here.